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The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and
enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer
and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the
manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the
channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted
manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower
level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer
is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted
manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit,
adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain.

1. Introduction
With the increase of the carbon emissions and the relative
deterioration of the climate, consumers are now very concerned about the environmental protection. As early as in
2002, more than 27% of the consumers in OECD countries
can be considered as “green consumers”, who have strong
willingness to buy environmentally friendly products even for
costing a little more, while the proportion of the European
green consumers is 75% in 2008 compared to 31% in 2005 [1].
Such consumer environmental awareness has a great impact
on the product demand [2] and hence promotes the emission
reduction in the industry [3, 4]. To provide information for
customers, some carbon labelling schemes are established.
For example, CO2 measured label and reducing CO2 label are
issued by Carbon Trust Authority in 2006 [5]. CO2 measured
label can accurately measure the carbon footprint of a product. Reducing CO2 label also demonstrates a manufacturer’s
commitment of carbon footprint reduction. These labelling
schemes ensure customers to choose green products.

Meanwhile, for mitigating the negative impact of climate
change and achieving the sustainable development, most of
governments all over the world tend to implement some
regulations to reduce the carbon emissions. For instance, as
early as in 2005, the first emission trading system is set up by
European Union [6], followed by the United States, Canada,
Japan, China, and other countries subsequently [7–9]. They
have adopted the cap-and-trade regulation to suppress the
increase of carbon emissions. This regulation is widely
adopted, since it achieves the goal of emission reduction by
means of both the regulation and the market and hence can
reduce the emission effectively without increasing the policy
costs significantly [10]. Under the cap-and-trade regulation,
a manufacturing enterprise is allocated a quota called “the
carbon cap” by the government. If the actual amount of
the emissions is more (conversely, less) than the quota, the
manufacturer can buy (conversely, sell) the emission permits
through the emission permit market. In modern industry,
the manufacturing is inseparable from energy consumption
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and carbon emissions. Thus, the cap-and-trade regulation has
an important impact on the operations management of the
manufacturer and even the whole supply chain, when the
consumer environmental awareness is considered. Therefore,
under the dual influence of the regulation and the market,
the supply chain is encouraged to reduce its carbon emissions
[11].
In principle, a decision-maker should adopt farsighted
strategies, which are concentrated on the long-term interests.
However, he/she sometimes needs to act as myopia to
focus on short-term profit, especially in a complex business
environment [12]. In the context of a dynamic supply chain,
because of the power inequality between the members, the
leader always makes a decision in a farsighted way and the follower maybe chooses myopia. Hence, there exists a prisoner’s
dilemma on the supply chain members’ behavioral choices
[13]. For exploring the reason, many researches investigate
the effects of myopia on marketing strategies (i.e., pricing and
advertising) and performance of the supply chain members
[14–17]. In recent years, the impacts of myopic behavior on
operations strategies, such as quality design and production
level, catch some attentions [18–21]. However, this effect on
emission decision is lacking. Some recent researches make
use of the technological innovation to study the behaviors in
green supply chain and describe the dynamic environment
by the cost learning effect [22] or the technology attenuation
effect [23, 24]. Instead, the evolution of “reference emissions”
is employed in this paper.
Reference emissions are the consumers’ perceived
amount of emissions and formed over time based on some
information. When consumers make a purchase decision,
they usually use the reference emissions to compare with
the current emissions from manufacturing unit product
at first. This effect of reference emissions is similar to the
reference price [25] and the reference quality [26], which
also play a critical role in the impact on the market demand.
In this paper, we investigate how the supply chain members’
myopic behavior affects the relationship between price and
emissions in the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer
and a retailer. Therefore, this work plans to complement the
previous researches by the integration of the consumers’
reference emissions, the manufacturer’s farsighted and
myopic behaviors, and the cap-and-trade regulation in a
dynamic framework. Three key questions are addressed in
this paper as follows.
(i) When the manufacturer acts in the farsighted or
myopic manner with the dynamics of reference emissions, what are the equilibrium emission reduction
level, wholesale, and retail prices? What are the
comparison results between two behavioral manners?
(ii) How does the manufacturer’s behavioral choice affect
the relationship of the price and the emissions? How
does the cap-and-trade regulation affect the behavior
choice?
(iii) Which behavior is the better choice of the manufacturer, and which manner the manufacturer acts
does the retailer prefer? When their choices are
inconsistent, how to solve this dilemma?

To answer the above questions, we establish a differential
game in a bilateral monopoly supply chain, in which the
manufacturer acts as a leader and determines the emission
reduction level and the wholesale price, and the retailer is a
follower and makes a decision on the retail price. Therefore,
they play a Stackelberg game and the manufacturer has two
behavioral choices, to be farsighted or to be myopic. Solving
both the behavior scenarios and comparing them yield some
interesting results, which can conclude important managerial
insights.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we give a review of the related literature. In
Section 3, we establish a differential game model with the
dynamics of reference emissions under the cap-and-trade
regulation. Section 4 is concerned with deriving equilibrium strategies in both farsighted and myopic scenarios. In
Section 5, the strategy choices and their impacts on profits are
analyzed. Finally, conclusions, our research limitations, and
future directions are summarized in Section 6.

2. Literature Review
This work is mainly related to three areas of researches in
the supply chain: consumers’ emission-sensitive demand and
government’s cap-and-trade regulation, myopic behavior in
the dynamic marketing and operations environments, and
reference effects in the behavioral research.
Consumers’ environmental awareness represents the
market power and hence has an internal driving effect on the
emission reduction of enterprises. Researchers describe the
emission-sensitive market by introducing the emissions as a
demand suppression factor in the market demand function
[27]. Ma et al. [28] analyze the impact of different emissionsensitive coefficients on manufacturer’s profits. The authors
find that although the emission reduction costs more for
the manufacturer, it also stimulates the demand function.
Therefore, the participants in the supply chain should coordinate two objectives: the emission reduction and the profitseeking. Sometimes, the emission reduction and the profit
of the supply chain increase simultaneously [29]. Under the
cap-and-trade regulation, the carbon quota and the emission
permit price affect the decision-making of the manufacturer
significantly [30]. Thus, many researches are concentrated on
this problem, such as the impacts of production efficiency
[31], two rival manufacturers’ competition strategy [32],
and two products’ production and pricing strategies [33].
Compared with the above works, our main contribution is
that we study the emission reduction of the supply chain in
a differential game framework and analyze the behavioral
choice in the dynamic environment.
In the context of dynamic supply chain, more and more
researches focus on the impact of myopia on the decisions.
In some scenarios, the manufacturer performs better when
cooperating with a farsighted retailer, and there are also other
scenarios in which the manufacturer performs better with
a myopic retailer [34]. Taking the manufacturer’s behavioral
choice into consideration, Zhang et al. [35] conclude that if
the manufacturer prices dynamically, it will gain more than
to be myopia. What is more, the supply chain efficiency is
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the lowest when both the players act as a farsighted manner,
and it is the highest when only the retailer chooses to be
farsighted. Considering sticky prices, Liu et al. [13] show that
the behavioral choices in the supply chain always come to
a prisoner’s dilemma: farsightedness is a better choice for
either of the members, but for both to act myopically makes
the whole supply chain better off. In addition, a revenue
sharing contract is introduced by the authors to mitigate the
adverse impacts. Other recent literature related to the myopic
behavior in the supply chain can be found in [16, 20, 26,
36]. The difference between our paper and the above is that
the emission reduction decision and pricing strategies are
integrated, and the influence of the manufacturer’s choice of
myopic behavior on the emission-price relationship is also
investigated here.
In the dynamic environment, most researches use the
reference price effects to describe the dynamics when the
pricing strategies are studied in supply chains [14, 16, 23,
25, 37, 38]. Then, to determine the quality decision in the
dynamic supply chain, the concept of reference quality is
introduced to depict the dynamics. For instance, Gavious
and Lowengart [18] consider the effects of the reference price
and the reference quality simultaneously and find that the
existence of the reference quality effects leads to higher price
and quality of the product in the steady state when compared
to those strategies without reference effects. In the same
dynamic setting, He et al. [39] propose a total cost-sharing
contract and prove it to be effective in the whole supply
chain. Another research by Liu et al. [26] only focuses on
the reference quality effects under a revenue sharing contract,
and the findings display that the myopic behavior of the
manufacturer results in a higher quality-price ratio which is
beneficial to the consumers. Two other similar studies are
[36, 40], the former of which considers a closed-loop supply
chain. Different from the price/quality reference in the above
papers, we propose the concept of “reference emissions” to
describe the dynamics in the supply chain.

3. Model Development
We consider a bilateral monopoly supply chain consisting of
one manufacturer and one retailer, denoted by the subscripts
“𝑚” and “𝑟”, respectively. The sequence of events is as follows.
The manufacturer first produces one featured product with
a certain emission reduction level 𝜏(𝑡) and announces the
wholesale price 𝑤(𝑡), and the retailer in response determines
the retail price 𝑝(𝑡) over time 𝑡. A Stackelberg differential
game is thus played between the manufacturer and the
retailer with the manufacturer as a leader and the retailer
following its decisions on emission reduction level and
wholesale price to control the retail price over time. In this
system, the emission reduction level can be considered as an
operational tool, while the price strategy can be considered as
a marketing tool. The manufacturer pursuits its own profits
by both operational and marketing tools, whereas the retailer
only uses the marketing tool to optimize its gains.
The emissions of the product are assumed to be observable after the production is completed, since nowadays it has
moved on to concentrate the emissions [41] in the production
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process and many carbon labelling schemes have been
established [5]. When consumers prepare to purchase this
product, they can evaluate the emissions for manufacturing
the product based on a benchmark, which is called reference
emissions. It is the perceived amount of emissions that is
formed over time utilizing the consumers’ information, such
as past emission levels, consumers’ previous experience on
this product, and so on. Following the method that has been
used in [16, 42] to depict the reference price effects and
[26, 36] to depict the reference quality effects, we employ an
exponential smoothing process of this historical emissions to
model the dynamics of reference emissions as follows:
𝑅̇ (𝑡) = 𝜃 ((1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸 − 𝑅 (𝑡)) ,
𝑅 (0) = 𝑅0 ≥ 0,

(1)

where 𝑅(𝑡) and 𝐸 denote the reference emissions and initial
emissions of unit product, respectively. Then, the item (1 −
𝜏(𝑡))𝐸 represents the actual emissions when the emission
reduction level 𝜏(𝑡) is implemented. It is obvious that 𝜏(𝑡)
should belong to the interval [0, 1) to keep practical. The
parameter 𝜃 is the memory parameter, which should be positive and continuous, and 𝑅0 represents the initial reference
emissions at time 𝑡 = 0.
Similar to previous literature [18, 26, 36] that describe the
reference price/quality, we assume that the market demand
is affected by reference emissions as well as market capacity, retail price, and emissions. The influence of reference
emissions is related to the gap between actual emissions and
reference emissions. Hence, the function of market demand
is given by
𝐷 (𝑝 (𝑡) , 𝜏 (𝑡) , 𝑅 (𝑡)) = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 (𝑡) − 𝛾1 (1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸
− 𝛾2 ((1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸 − 𝑅 (𝑡)) ,

(2)

where 𝛼 > 0 represents the market capacity, 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛾1 > 0
reflect the effects of retail price and emissions on current
demand, respectively, and 𝛾2 > 0 captures the reference
emission effects. A higher 𝛾2 > 0 means that consumers are
more sensitive to the gap between the actual emissions and
the reference emissions, and 𝛾2 = 0 means no reference effect
exists. This specification for demand function is derived from
the classic linear demand function 𝐷(𝑝) = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝, combined
with the emission effect which is widely used in the literature
such as [1, 20, 43].
The total costs of the supply chain consist of the manufacturing cost, the emission reduction cost, and the emission
cost. Let 𝑐 denote the unit manufacturing cost and 𝐶(𝜏(𝑡))
denote the emission reduction cost. In accordance with the
former literature [44–46], a quadratic cost function about
emission reduction level is used as follows:
𝐶 (𝜏 (𝑡)) =

𝑘 2
𝜏 (𝑡) ,
2

(3)

where 𝑘 represents the cost coefficient of emission reduction.
Increasing marginal mitigation cost means that the manufacturer has to spend more to further reduce emissions when it
has been in a high level of emission reduction.
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The emission cost is considered in an emission permits
trading scheme. The manufacturer is allocated a certain
quantity of emission permits for each time point, named as
initial quota 𝐸0 . If the amount of manufacturer’s emission
is not equal to the emission quota, the manufacturer can
trade the emission permits in the emission permit market.
For instance, the manufacturer has to buy the emission
permits with the price of 𝑆, if the total emissions, 𝐸(1 −
𝜏(𝑡))𝐷(𝑝(𝑡), 𝜏(𝑡), 𝑅(𝑡)), exceed the quota. Conversely, if 𝐸(1 −
𝜏(𝑡))𝐷(𝑝(𝑡), 𝜏(𝑡), 𝑅(𝑡)) < 𝐸0 , the manufacturer can sell the
surplus of the emission permits. Note that the above way
to express the cost/revenue from the trade of the emission
permits is commonly used in the literature [47–49]. In the
following discussions, we assume 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑐 + 𝑆𝐸) − 𝛾1 𝐸 > 0 to
ensure that the demand is positive.
When an infinite time horizon is assumed, the objective
functionals of both players are given by
∞

𝐽𝑚 = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡 ((𝑤 (𝑡) − 𝑐) 𝐷 (𝑝 (𝑡) , 𝜏 (𝑡) , 𝑅 (𝑡))

profits and the streams of future profits simultaneously.
In contrast, when the channel members act as a myopic
behavior, they only maximize their current profits and ignore
the future influence of their decision-making on the evolution
of the state dynamics. These two scenarios are successively
considered in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Since the manufacturer
is the leader in the Stackelberg differential games, and its
behaviors affect the equilibrium strategies significantly, we
will get the feedback equilibrium solutions in farsighted and
myopic scenarios, respectively.
From (6a), (6b), and (6c), we find that the retail price is
absent in the dynamics of (6c). It means that the retailer’s
behavior choice has no influence on the decision for retail
price. Thus, the equilibrium retail price can be obtained from
the following optimization problem in (7) firstly.
max {(𝑝 − 𝑤) (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾1 (1 − 𝜏) 𝐸 − 𝛾2 ((1 − 𝜏) 𝐸 − 𝑅))} . (7)
𝑝

Thus, the pricing reaction function of the retailer is given by

0

− 𝑆 (𝐸 (1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐷 (𝑝 (𝑡) , 𝜏 (𝑡) , 𝑅 (𝑡)) − 𝐸0 )

(4)

− 𝐶 (𝜏 (𝑡))) 𝑑𝑡,
∞

𝐽𝑟 = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡 (𝑝 (𝑡) − 𝑤 (𝑡)) 𝐷 (𝑝 (𝑡) , 𝜏 (𝑡) , 𝑅 (𝑡)) 𝑑𝑡,
0

(5)

where 𝜌 is a positive discount rate.
Thus, taking the above dynamic relationships, (1)-(5),
together, a differential game between the manufacture and the
retailer in the emission permits trading scheme is developed
as follows:
∞

max

𝑤(⋅),𝜏(⋅)

∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡 ((𝑤 (𝑡) − 𝑐 − 𝑆𝐸 (1 − 𝜏 (𝑡))) (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 (𝑡)
0

𝑘
− 𝛾1 (1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸 − 𝛾2 ((1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸 − 𝑅 (𝑡))) − 𝜏2 (𝑡)
2

(6a)

+ 𝑆𝐸0 ) 𝑑𝑡,
∞

max
𝑝(⋅)

−𝜌𝑡

∫ 𝑒
0

(𝑝 (𝑡) − 𝑤 (𝑡)) (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 (𝑡) − 𝛾1 (1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸

In (6a), (6b), and (6c), we depict a Stackelberg differential
game with two players, three control variables, 𝑤(𝑡), 𝜏(𝑡), and
𝑝(𝑡), as well as one state variable 𝑅(𝑡). In common, the players’
strategies should be stationary in the infinite time horizon
game [50]. This assumption will be used in the following
section for model solving.

4. Farsighted and Myopic Solutions
In a farsighted scenario, both the members of the supply
chain consider the impact of their behaviors on their current

(8)

4.1. Farsighted Scenario. The farsighted scenario means that
the manufacturer adopts farsighted strategies and takes
full account of the impacts of its decision-making on the
dynamics of reference emissions. Let the superscript “𝐹”
signify the “Farsighted” scenario, and let 𝑉𝑟𝐹 and 𝑉𝑚𝐹 denote
the value functions of the retailer and the manufacturer,
respectively. We assume that the retailer’s decision on the
retail price shown in (8) is known in order to get the
feedback equilibrium strategies. Then, substituting (8) into
the objectives of (6a), (6b), and (6c), the Hamiltonian-JacobiBellman (HJB) equations of both players can be established as
follows:

(6b)

(6c)

𝛼 + 𝛽𝑤 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸 (1 − 𝜏)
𝛾2
𝑅+
.
2𝛽
2𝛽

Equation (8) implies that the retail price is positively
related with the wholesale price, the emission reduction level,
and the reference emissions.

𝜌𝑉𝑟𝐹 =

− 𝛾2 ((1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸 − 𝑅 (𝑡))) 𝑑𝑡,
s.t. 𝑅̇ (𝑡) = 𝜃 ((1 − 𝜏 (𝑡)) 𝐸 − 𝑅 (𝑡)) , 𝑅 (0) = 𝑅0 .

𝑝 (𝜏, 𝑤, 𝑅) =

2

(𝛾 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸
𝛾
1 𝛼 𝛽
( − 𝑤 + 2𝑅 − 1
(1 − 𝜏))
𝛽 2 2
2
2

(9)

𝜕𝑉𝐹
+ 𝑟 𝜃 ((1 − 𝜏) 𝐸 − 𝑅) ,
𝜕𝑅
𝜌𝑉𝑚𝐹 = max {(𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝑆𝐸 (1 − 𝜏))
𝜏,𝑤

⋅(

(𝛾 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸
𝛾
𝑘
𝛼 𝛽
− 𝑤 + 2𝑅 − 1
(1 − 𝜏)) − 𝜏2
2 2
2
2
2

+ 𝑆𝐸0 +

(10)

𝜕𝑉𝑚𝐹
𝜃 ((1 − 𝜏) 𝐸 − 𝑅)} .
𝜕𝑅

We define the following notations to simplify the expression
of the model:

Complexity

5

𝑎1 ≡ (𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸,

(11)

𝑎2 ≡ 4𝛽𝑘 − 𝑎12 ,

(12)

𝑎3 ≡ 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝑎1 ,

(13)

𝑎4 ≡ 𝛾2 𝐸𝑎1 + 𝑎2 ,

(14)
2

Δ ≡ √(𝜌𝑎2 + 2𝜃𝑎4 ) − 16𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2 𝑘𝛾22 ,

(16)

𝑎6 ≡ (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) (𝜌𝑎2 + 𝜃𝑎4 ) + 4𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3 .

(17)

The parameter constraint 𝑎2 > 0 is needed to guarantee
that the right side of (10) is concave in (𝜏, 𝑤) and hence
the maximum exists. We depict the equilibrium emission
reduction level, wholesale price, and retail price as functions
of reference emissions 𝑅 and obtain the value functions of
the manufacturer and the retailer in Proposition 1. The proof
for this proposition and subsequent ones, as well as the
corollaries, are given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. In the farsighted scenario, the feedback equilibrium emission reduction level, wholesale price, and retail price
are given by

𝑤𝐹 = (

𝑎5 − 2𝛾2 𝜃𝐸𝑎1
2𝑎6
𝑅−
,
2𝜃𝐸𝑎2
𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

𝑎5 (𝑎1 − 2𝛾1 𝐸 − 2𝛾2 𝐸) 𝛾2 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 2𝑘)
−
)𝑅
4𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑎2
𝑎2

+

𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 2𝑎6 (𝑎1 − 2𝛾1 𝐸 − 2𝛾2 𝐸)
,
+
2𝛽
2𝛽𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

𝑎 (𝑎 − 4𝛾1 𝐸 − 4𝛾2 𝐸) 𝛾2 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 3𝑘)
−
)𝑅
𝑝𝐹 = ( 5 1
8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑎2
𝑎2
3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 2𝑎6 (𝑎1 − 4𝛾1 𝐸 − 4𝛾2 𝐸)
,
+
+
4𝛽
4𝛽𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

(18)

(19)

(20)

𝑎 (𝑎 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3
𝑎5
𝑅2 + 5 2
𝑅
2
2
16𝛽𝜃 𝐸
4𝛽𝜃𝐸 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )
+

𝑘𝑎32
𝑆𝐸0
+
𝜌
2𝜌𝑎2

+

(𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) (𝑎5 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3 )
4𝜌𝛽𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

⋅(

+

(𝑎5 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3 )
2

8𝜌𝛽𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

,

2𝑎1 𝑎6
1 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐
)
(
−
𝜌𝛽
4
4𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

(22)

𝑎6 (𝑎1 𝑎5 − 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 )
2

𝜌𝛽𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

⋅(

𝑎6 (2𝑎1 Δ + 𝑎1 𝑎5 − 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 ) 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐
−
).
4
4𝑎2 Δ (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

From Proposition 1, we know that the equilibrium emission reduction level, wholesale price, and retail price are
linear with respect to the reference emissions. Moreover, the
value functions of both players are convex in the reference
emissions. That is to say, the reference emissions have the
increasing marginal contribution to both players’ profits.
Note that the carbon quota exists only in (21). This implies
that carbon quota does not affect the retailer’s profit and the
decisions of emission reduction level, wholesale price, and
retail price. The government should allocate sufficient carbon
quota to ensure profitability of the manufacturer.
Substitute the equilibrium emission reduction level, i.e.,
(18), into (6c). Then, we get a differential equation. Solving
this equation and using Proposition 1, we have Proposition 2
as follows.
Proposition 2. In the farsighted scenario, the trajectories for
the equilibrium emission reduction level, wholesale price, and
retail price are given by
𝐹
2𝛾2 𝜃𝐸𝑎1 − 𝑎5
𝐹
𝐹
(𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜏∞
,
2𝜃𝐸𝑎2

𝑤𝐹 (𝑡) = (
⋅ (𝑅0 −
𝑝𝐹 (𝑡) = (

𝑎5 (𝑎1 − 2𝛾1 𝐸 − 2𝛾2 𝐸) 𝛾2 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 2𝑘)
−
)
4𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑎2
𝑎2

𝐹
𝐹
𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡

+

(23)

(24)

𝐹
𝑤∞
,

𝑎5 (𝑎1 − 4𝛾1 𝐸 − 4𝛾2 𝐸) 𝛾2 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 3𝑘)
−
)
8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑎2
𝑎2

(25)

𝐹

𝐹
𝐹
⋅ (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝑝∞
,

(21)

and the trajectories for the reference emissions and the demand
are given by
𝐹

𝐹
𝐹
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝑅∞
,
𝑅𝐹 (𝑡) = (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞

2

+

𝑎6 (2𝑎1 Δ + 𝑎1 𝑎5 − 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 ) 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐
−
)𝑅
4
4𝑎2 Δ (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )
2

+

𝜏𝐹 (𝑡) =

and the value functions for the manufacturer and the retailer
are given by
𝑉𝑚𝐹 (𝑅) =

2

(𝑎1 𝑎5 − 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 ) 2 (𝑎1 𝑎5 − 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 )
𝑅 +
64𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2 𝑎2 Δ
2𝛽𝜃𝐸 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

(15)

𝑎5 ≡ 𝜌𝑎2 + 2𝜃𝑎4 − Δ,

𝜏𝐹 = 1 −

𝑉𝑟𝐹 (𝑅) =

𝐷𝐹 (𝑡) = (

𝐹
𝛾2 𝛽𝑘
𝑎𝑎
𝐹
𝐹
− 1 5 ) (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝐷∞
,
𝑎2
8𝜃𝐸𝑎2

(26)
(27)

6

Complexity

where
𝛿𝐹 =
𝐹
𝑅∞
=

Δ − 𝜌𝑎2
,
2𝑎2
4𝜃𝐸𝑎6
,
− 𝜌2 𝑎22

Δ2

𝐹
=1−
𝜏∞

4𝜃𝑎6
,
Δ2 − 𝜌2 𝑎22

(28)
(29)
(30)

𝐹
=
𝑤∞

𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 2𝜃𝐸𝑎6 (𝛽𝑆 − 𝛾1 )
,
+
2𝛽
𝛽 (Δ2 − 𝜌2 𝑎22 )

(31)

𝐹
=
𝑝∞

3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 𝜃𝐸𝑎6 (𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 )
,
+
4𝛽
𝛽 (Δ2 − 𝜌2 𝑎22 )

(32)

𝐹
=
𝐷∞

𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 𝜃𝐸𝑎6 (𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾1 )
.
−
4
Δ2 − 𝜌2 𝑎22

(33)

From Proposition 2, we find that if 𝛿𝐹 > 0, the emission
reduction level 𝜏𝐹 (𝑡), the prices 𝑤𝐹 (𝑡), 𝑝𝐹 (𝑡), the reference
emissions 𝑅𝐹 (𝑡), and the demand 𝐷𝐹 (𝑡) can converge to their
𝐹
𝐹
𝐹
𝐹
𝐹
, 𝑤∞
, 𝑝∞
, 𝑅∞
, and 𝐷∞
, respectively, when
steady states 𝜏∞
𝑡 → +∞. Here, we have to emphasize that the steady-state
reference emissions are equal to the steady-state emissions
of unit product. Moreover, denote 𝐴 1 ≡ (𝑎5 (𝑎1 − 4𝛾1 𝐸 −
4𝛾2 𝐸)/8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑎2 − 𝛾2 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 3𝑘)/𝑎2 ) and 𝐴 2 ≡ (𝑎5 (𝑎1 − 2𝛾1 𝐸 −
2𝛾2 𝐸)/4𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑎2 − 𝛾2 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 2𝑘)/𝑎2 ). Then, from Proposition 2,
according to the size relationship of the initial reference
𝐹
, as well as
emissions 𝑅0 and the steady-state emissions 𝑅∞
other parameters, both supply chain members can choose
penetration or skimming strategy. The following corollary
describes the corresponding results.
Corollary 3. On the basis of initial reference emission 𝑅0 , the
𝐹
, and the items 𝐴 1 and 𝐴 2 , we provide
steady-state emission 𝑅∞
the pricing and emission strategies as follows:
𝐹
(i) when 𝐴 2 (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) > 0, the farsighted manufacturer
leads to the skimming pricing strategy; when 𝐴 2 (𝑅0 −
𝐹
) < 0, the farsighted manufacturer leads to the
𝑅∞
penetration pricing strategy;
𝐹
𝐴 1 (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
)

(ii) when
> 0, the farsighted retailer leads to
𝐹
the skimming pricing strategy; when 𝐴 1 (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) < 0,
the farsighted retailer leads to the penetration pricing
strategy;
𝐹
) > 0, the farsighted man(iii) when (2𝛾2 𝜃𝐸𝑎1 −𝑎5 )(𝑅0 −𝑅∞
ufacturer leads to the penetration emission strategy,
i.e., the emission reduction level decreases over time;
𝐹
) < 0, the farsighted
when (2𝛾2 𝜃𝐸𝑎1 − 𝑎5 )(𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
manufacturer leads to the skimming emission strategy;
i.e., the emission reduction level increases over time.

Corollary 3 shows that the retailer adopts the same
pricing strategy as the manufacturer if 𝐴 1 𝐴 2 > 0, while
if 𝐴 1 𝐴 2 < 0, the retailer implements the opposite pricing
strategy. When 2𝛾2 𝜃𝐸𝑎1 − 𝑎5 < 0, the manufacturer adopts

a high emission level initially and then gradually reduces
the emissions if consumers have a high enough reference
emission. The reason is that 2𝛾2 𝜃𝐸𝑎1 − 𝑎5 < 0 implies
the reference effect plays a major role, and a farsighted
manufacturer can trace the consumers’ emission-learning
process. When 2𝛾2 𝜃𝐸𝑎1 − 𝑎5 > 0, price, emissions, and
costs mainly affect the emission reduction strategy and the
manufacturer ignores the reference effect.
In Corollary 4, we report the comparative static results
for the steady-strategies, the reference emissions, and the
demand on the key parameters 𝜌, 𝛾2 , 𝜃, and 𝑘 in the farsighted
scenario. We find that the parameters 𝜌 and 𝛾2 versus 𝜃 and
𝑘 have the opposite effects. Taking the emission reduction
level as an example, the steady-state value is rising with the
increase of discount rate 𝜌 and reference emission parameter
𝛾2 , and falling with the increase of memory parameter 𝜃 and
the cost parameter of emission reduction 𝑘. This means that
when consumers are more sensitive to the emission difference
between the actual emissions and preference emissions or
hold better emission memory, or the manufacturer holds
less patience, or emission reduction costs less, the manufacturer makes choice of a higher emission reduction level.
Meanwhile, the emissions of unit product are lower and the
demand is larger. Furthermore, there exists a threshold of
the carbon price for both the prices, respectively. When the
manufacturer/retailer faces a lower carbon price, i.e., 𝑆 <
𝛾1 /𝛽 for the manufacturer or 𝑆 < 3(𝛾1 /𝛽) for the retailer,
the price has the same trends as the emission reduction level.
On the contrary, when the carbon price is higher, both the
players’ determined prices have the opposite trends. That is
because the marketing tools play a major role on players’
profits, since we can rewrite the inequalities as 𝛽 > 𝛾1 /𝑆 and
𝛽 > 3(𝛾1 /𝑆). Moreover, the carbon price appears only in the
manufacturer’s value function. This implies that the carbon
price affects the manufacturer directly and affects the retailer
indirectly through the wholesale price. Thus, the threshold for
the retail price is larger than that for the wholesale price.
Corollary 4. In the farsighted scenario, the comparative static
analyses for the steady-state strategies are summarized in
Table 1.
4.2. Myopic Scenario. The myopic scenario means that the
manufacturer disregards the influence on the dynamics of
reference emission and pays attention to the current profits
when making decisions on the emission reduction and the
wholesale price. In this scenario, the optimal control problem
is reduced to such a static optimization problem at each time
point as follows:
max
𝑤,𝜏

(𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝑆𝐸 (1 − 𝜏)) (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝 − 𝛾1 (1 − 𝜏) 𝐸

1
− 𝛾2 ((1 − 𝜏) 𝐸 − 𝑅)) − 𝑘𝜏2 + 𝑆𝐸0 ,
2
s.t.

𝑅̇ = 𝜃 ((1 − 𝜏) 𝐸 − 𝑅) .

(34a)

(34b)

The superscript “𝑀” is used to signify “Myopic scenario”.
Then, the equilibrium results are presented as follows, when
the manufacturer is myopic.
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Table 1: Comparative static results for the farsighted scenario.

Parameters
𝜌
𝛾2
𝜃
𝑘

𝐹
𝑅∞

𝐹
𝜏∞

↓
↓
↑
↑

↑
↑
↓
↓

𝛾
𝑆< 1
𝛽
↑
↑
↓
↓

𝐹
𝑤∞

𝛾
𝑆> 1
𝛽
↓
↓
↑
↑

𝛾
𝑆<3 1
𝛽
↑
↑
↓
↓

𝐹
𝑝∞

𝑆>3

𝛾1
𝛽

↓
↓
↑
↑

𝐹
𝐷∞

↑
↑
↓
↓

Note: ↑, increase; ↓, decrease.

Proposition 5. In the myopic scenario, the trajectories for the
equilibrium emission reduction level, wholesale price, and retail
price are given by
𝑀
𝛾𝑎
𝑀
𝑀
𝜏𝑀 (𝑡) = 2 1 (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝜏∞
,
𝑎2

(36)

𝑀
𝛾 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 3𝑘)
𝑀
𝑀
𝑝𝑀 (𝑡) = − 2
(𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝑝∞
,
𝑎2

(37)

the trajectories for the reference emissions and the demand are
given by
𝑀
𝑅𝑀 (𝑡) = (𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿

𝑀

𝑡

𝑀
+ 𝑅∞
,

𝑀
𝛽𝑘𝛾2
𝑀
𝑀
(𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝐷∞
,
𝑎2

𝐷𝑀 (𝑡) =

(38)
(39)

and the value functions for the manufacturer and the
retailer are given by
𝑉𝑚𝑀 (𝑅)

𝑆𝐸
𝑎
= 2 𝑉𝑟𝑀 (𝑅) + 0 ,
2𝛽𝑘
𝜌

𝑉𝑟𝑀 (𝑅) =

𝛽𝑘2 𝛾22

𝑎2 (𝜌𝑎2 + 2𝜃𝑎4 )

(40)

(41)

where
𝛿𝑀 =

𝜃𝑎4
,
𝑎2

(42)

𝑀
𝑅∞
=

𝐸 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 )
,
𝑎4

(43)

(𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 )
,
𝑎4

𝑀
𝑝∞
=

3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) (𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 ) 𝐸
,
+
4𝛽
4𝛽𝑎4

(46)

𝑀
𝐷∞
=

𝛽𝑘 (𝛾2 𝐸 + 𝑎3 )
.
𝑎4

(47)

Proposition 5 shows that the trajectories and steady states
of myopic scenario are similar to those of farsighted scenario,
which are represented in Propositions 1 and 2. Since the
manufacturer does not consider the evolution of the reference
emissions, the steady states have no relationship with the
parameters 𝜃 and 𝜌. From (40), we know that the expression
of manufacturer’s value function consists of two items. The
first item represents the income from the manufacturing and
sale of the product, while the second item, which is also
included in the farsighted scenario, represents the income
from the carbon quota. Thus, the effects of carbon quota on
the supply chain’s decisions and performance are the same
𝑀
(𝑅) as
as those in the farsighted scenario. We denote 𝑉𝑚,𝑚
the first item, i.e., “product profits”. Then, the profits of both
players in the myopic scenario are compared in Corollary 6.
Corollary 6. In the myopic scenario, the manufacturer’s product profits and the retailer’s profits are compared as follows:

𝑀
(𝑅) = 𝑉𝑟𝑀(𝑅), if 𝑆 = √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽−(𝛾1 +𝛾2 )/𝛽 holds;
(ii) 𝑉𝑚,𝑚

2𝜃𝐸𝛽𝑘2 𝛾2 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) (𝜃𝛾2 𝐸 (𝑎2 + 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + (𝜌 + 2𝜃) 𝑎2 𝑎3 )
+
,
𝜌𝑎22 (𝜌𝑎2 + 𝜃𝑎4 ) (𝜌𝑎2 + 2𝜃𝑎4 )

𝑀
𝜏∞
=1−

(45)

𝑀
(i) 𝑉𝑚,𝑚
(𝑅) < 𝑉𝑟𝑀(𝑅), if 𝑆 > √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽−(𝛾1 +𝛾2 )/𝛽 holds;

𝑅2

𝛽𝑘2 𝑎32
2𝛽𝑘2 𝛾2 (𝜃𝛾2 𝐸 (𝑎2 + 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + (𝜌 + 2𝜃) 𝑎2 𝑎3 )
+
𝑅+
𝜌𝑎22
𝑎2 (𝜌𝑎2 + 𝜃𝑎4 ) (𝜌𝑎2 + 2𝜃𝑎4 )

𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) (𝛽𝑆 − 𝛾1 ) 𝐸
,
+
2𝛽
2𝛽𝑎4

(35)

𝑀
𝛾2 (𝑆𝐸𝑎1 − 2𝑘)
𝑀
𝑀
(𝑅0 − 𝑅∞
) 𝑒−𝛿 𝑡 + 𝑤∞
,
𝑎2

𝑤𝑀 (𝑡) = −

𝑀
𝑤∞
=

(44)

𝑀
(𝑅) > 𝑉𝑟𝑀(𝑅), if 𝑆 < √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽−(𝛾1 +𝛾2 )/𝛽 holds.
(iii) 𝑉𝑚,𝑚

From Corollary 6, we obtain a result that the retailer’s
profits are greater than the manufacturer’s product profits
when 𝑆 > √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )/𝛽, although the retailer is the
follower in the Stackelberg game. What is more interesting,
when the emission permit price is relatively high and the
emission quota is relatively low, the retailer’s profits maybe
exceed the manufacturer’s total profits. This is because both
the influences of carbon emission and price on the market
demand are integrated in the model.
We rewrite the inequalities 𝑆 > √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )/𝛽
and 𝑆 < √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽−(𝛾1 +𝛾2 )/𝛽 as 𝑆+(𝛾1 +𝛾2 )/𝛽 > √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽
and 𝑆 + (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )/𝛽 < √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽, respectively. Then, the item
𝑆 + (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )/𝛽 can be regarded as the “relative value” of the
manufacturer’s emission reduction, while the item √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽
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Table 2: Comparative static results for the myopic scenario.

Parameters
𝛾2
𝑘

𝑀
𝑅∞

𝑀
𝜏∞

↓
↑

↑
↓

𝛾
𝑆< 1
𝛽
↑
↓

𝑀
𝑤∞

𝛾
𝑆> 1
𝛽
↓
↑

𝛾
𝑆<3 1
𝛽
↑
↓

𝑀
𝑝∞

𝑆>3
↓
↑

𝛾1
𝛽

𝑀
𝐷∞

↑
↓

Note: ↑, increase; ↓, decrease.

represents the “relative cost” of the manufacturer’s emission
reduction. Then, on one hand, for a high relative value and a
low relative cost of the emission reduction, the manufacturer
opts for a high emission reduction level. This results in the
sharply growth of the demand. Thus, the retailer can perform
better than the manufacturer. On the other hand, when the
relative value of emission reduction is relatively low and
the relative cost of emission reduction is relatively high, the
manufacturer needs to keep a high wholesale price so as to
make up for the cost of emission reduction. Hence, its profits
are more than the retailer. Additionally, when the profit item
𝑆𝐸0 /𝜌 is relatively high, the manufacture may always gain
more profits than the retailer by means of more efforts on
emission reduction and/or the acquisition of high carbon
quota.
Denote 𝐴 3 ≡ (√(𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )2 𝐸2 + 8𝛽𝑘 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )𝐸)/2𝛽𝐸 and

has to be balanced by setting a high price; otherwise, high
emission permit price results in some income from the quota
saving and hence the members can set a low price. Since the
manufacturer is the leader, it meets a lower threshold than the
retailer.
Corollary 8 reports the comparative static results in the
myopic scenario. Here, only two key parameters 𝛾2 and 𝑘
have effects. They have the same influence as in the farsighted
scenario, since when 𝜌 tends to infinity and/or 𝜃 tends to zero,
all the farsighted strategies reduce to the myopic ones.

𝐴 4 ≡ (√(𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )2 𝐸2 + 12𝛽𝑘 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )𝐸)/2𝛽𝐸. Similar to
the pricing and emission strategies in the farsighted scenario,
the strategies in the myopic scenario are summarized in
Corollary 7.

In this section, we compare the steady-state strategies
between farsighted and myopic scenarios and then analyze
the manufacturer’s behavior choice through the profit comparison in these two scenarios.

Corollary 7. On the basis of initial reference emission 𝑅0 and
𝑀
, we provide the pricing and emission
steady-state emission 𝑅∞
strategies as follows.

5.1. Strategy Comparisons. In the steady state, the strategies
under both the farsighted and the myopic scenarios are
compared in Proposition 9.

𝑀
(i) When 𝑅0 > 𝑅∞
, both the players lead to the
skimming pricing strategy if 𝑆 < 𝐴 3 holds; the myopic
manufacturer leads to the penetration pricing strategy
and the myopic retailer leads to the skimming pricing
strategy if 𝐴 3 < 𝑆 < 𝐴 4 holds; both the players lead to
the penetration pricing strategy if 𝑆 > 𝐴 4 holds.

Proposition 9. In the steady state, the comparisons of the
emission reduction levels and the prices between both scenarios
are depicted as follows:

𝑀
, both the myopic players lead to the
(ii) When 𝑅0 < 𝑅∞
penetration pricing strategy if 𝑆 < 𝐴 3 holds; the myopic
manufacturer leads to the skimming pricing strategy
and the myopic retailer leads to the penetration pricing
strategy if 𝐴 3 < 𝑆 < 𝐴 4 holds; both the players lead to
the skimming pricing strategy if 𝑆 > 𝐴 4 holds.

𝑀
, the myopic manufacturer leads to
(iii) When 𝑅0 > 𝑅∞
𝑀
the penetration emission strategy; when 𝑅0 < 𝑅∞
, the
myopic manufacturer leads to the skimming emission
strategy.

Corollary 7 shows that when consumers have a high
enough reference emission, the manufacturer sets to a low
emission level at the initial time to avoid the negative
impact resulting from the ignored influence on the reference
emissions. Moreover, if the emission permit price is low
enough, i.e., 𝑆 < 𝐴 3 , the high cost of emission reduction

Corollary 8. In the myopic scenario, the comparative static
analyses for the steady-state strategies are summarized in
Table 2.

5. Scenario Comparison

𝑀
𝐹
> 𝜏∞
;
(i) 𝜏∞

𝑀
𝐹
𝑀
𝐹
< 𝑤∞
if 𝑆 > 𝛾1 /𝛽 holds, and 𝑤∞
≥ 𝑤∞
otherwise;
(ii) 𝑤∞

𝑀
𝐹
𝑀
𝐹
< 𝑝∞
if 𝑆 > 3𝛾1 /𝛽 holds, and 𝑝∞
≥ 𝑝∞
otherwise.
(iii) 𝑝∞

Proposition 9 implies that, in the steady state, the myopic
manufacturer makes greater efforts to reduce emissions than
the farsighted one. However, in which scenario the manufacturer/retailer sets higher price depends on the emission permit price. That is to say, when facing a myopic manufacturer,
consumers will purchase a relatively low-emission product
at a lower price if the emission permit price is higher than
3𝛾1 /𝛽, and at a higher price otherwise. On the contrary, when
facing a farsighted manufacturer, consumers will purchase
a relatively high-emission and high-price product if the
emission permit price is higher than 3𝛾1 /𝛽, and they will
purchase a relatively high-emission and low-price product
otherwise.
In order to explain this finding, we review some results
of strategy comparisons with reference price/quality effects.

Complexity

𝐹 𝐹
𝑝∞ between the
Proposition 10. The steady-state products 𝑅∞
farsighted and myopic scenarios are compared as follows:
𝑀 𝑀
𝐹 𝐹
𝐹
𝑝∞ < 𝑅∞
𝑝∞ , if ((𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 )/2𝛽)𝑅∞
+ (3𝛼 +
(i) 𝑅∞
𝛽𝑐)/4𝛽 > 0 holds;
𝑀 𝑀
𝐹 𝐹
𝐹
(ii) 𝑅∞
𝑝∞ > 𝑅∞
𝑝∞ , if ((𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 )/2𝛽)𝑅∞
+ (3𝛼 +
𝛽𝑐)/4𝛽 < 0 holds.

From Proposition 10, we know that there exists a thresh𝐹
+ (3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐)/4𝛽. When the threshold is
old ((𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 )/2𝛽)𝑅∞
positive, the consumers can gain more, i.e., lower emissionprice product, in the myopic scenario. In other words, when
the consumers are less sensitive to the emission and/or the
emission permit price is higher, the emission-price product
is lower in the myopic scenario. In contrast, when the
threshold is negative, the consumers can be benefited from
the farsighted setting.
5.2. Behavioral Choice. It depends on the profit comparison
between the farsighted and the myopic scenarios that which
behavior the manufacturer prefers to choose and which
behavior the retailer wants the manufacturer to act. If the
manufacturer decides to act as a farsighted manner and the
retailer prefers a farsighted cooperator, i.e., 𝑉𝑚𝐹 > 𝑉𝑚𝑀 and
𝑉𝑟𝐹 > 𝑉𝑟𝑀, or the manufacturer as a myopic manner and the
retailer prefers a myopic cooperator, i.e., 𝑉𝑚𝑀 > 𝑉𝑚𝐹 and 𝑉𝑟𝑀 >

99
98
97
Vm

Martı́n-Herrán [16] show, that in the steady state, the equilibrium price is set to be lower by a myopic player than that
by a farsighted one. The authors explain that the myopic
player disregards the price learning process of the consumers.
What is more, the study by Liu et al. [26] finds that, in the
presence of reference quality effects, a manufacturer opts for
a lower product quality since a higher quality results in a
higher reference quality and hence causes a negative impact
on the market demand. Similar to the reference quality
effects, a lower amount of emissions results in lower reference
emissions which also affect the demand negatively. Thus,
the farsighted manufacturer sets a lower level of emission
reduction according to the dynamics of reference emissions.
Moreover, a higher price is adopted by both the farsighted manufacturer and the corresponding retailer when
the emission permit price is especially high, i.e., 𝑆 > 3𝛾1 /𝛽.
Conversely, a higher price is adopted by both the players
in the myopic setting when the emission permit price is
especially low, i.e., 𝑆 < 𝛾1 /𝛽. Otherwise, when 𝛾1 /𝛽 < 𝑆 <
3𝛾1 /𝛽, a higher price is used by the farsighted manufacturer
and the myopic-setting retailer.
From Proposition 9, we know that the farsighted manufacturer will adopt a high-emission strategy and the
farsighted-setting retailer will select a high-price if 𝑆 >
3𝛾1 /𝛽 holds, while selecting a low-price if 𝑆 < 3𝛾1 /𝛽 holds.
However, the myopic manufacturer will take a low-emission
strategy and the myopic-setting retailer will select a lowprice if 𝑆 > 3𝛾1 /𝛽 holds, while selecting a high-price if 𝑆 <
3𝛾1 /𝛽 holds. Which strategy benefits the consumers more? To
answer this question, we give a definition of “emission-price
product”, which is the product of the emissions and the price,
and then use it in Proposition 10.
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Figure 1: The profits of the manufacturer as 𝑆 increases.

𝑉𝑟𝐹 , they can reach agreement and adopt the corresponding
actions. However, if the manufacturer opts for a farsighted
behavior and the retailer prefers a myopic cooperator, i.e.,
𝑉𝑚𝐹 > 𝑉𝑚𝑀 and 𝑉𝑟𝑀 > 𝑉𝑟𝐹 , or the manufacturer acts as a myopic
manner and the retailer prefers a farsighted cooperator, i.e.,
𝑉𝑚𝑀 > 𝑉𝑚𝐹 and 𝑉𝑟𝐹 > 𝑉𝑟𝑀, either the manufacturer or
the retailer will lose profits. To deal with this dilemma, two
cooperators have to negotiate a solution, which can be better
off for each other.
Intuitively, the manufacturer should make a choice of
farsighted behavior to maximize the long-term profits, since
it acts as a leader in the supply chain. Meanwhile, its choice
will reduce the retailer’s profits if the retailer wants a myopic
manufacturer. However, is it true?
To make the discussion meaningful and in practice, the
control variables and the state variable should satisfy the
nonnegative constraints, which we ignore in our calculation.
Since it is difficult to obtain an analytical solution by comparison of both scenarios’ profits, therefore, we analyze the profits
by means of numerical simulations. We set the benchmark
values of the parameters, which satisfy the nonnegative
constraints, as follows.
(i) Demand parameters: 𝛼 = 10, 𝛽 = 1, 𝛾1 = 0.3, 𝛾2 = 0.7.
(ii) Cost parameters: 𝑐 = 1, 𝑘 = 2.
(iii) Reference emission parameters: 𝜃 = 2.
(iv) Emission parameters: 𝐸0 = 0.2, 𝐸 = 0.4, 𝑆 = 0.5.
(v) Discount rate: 𝜌 = 0.1.
These parameters are set based on previous studies
related to the feedback equilibrium strategies of pricing
and operations [20, 26]. At first, we analyze the profits of
the manufacturer, the retailer, and the whole supply chain
(denoted by the subscript “𝑠𝑐”) as the emission permit price
changes. The results in both scenarios are plotted in Figures
1–3. As the intuition discussed above, the manufacturer
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Figure 4: The comparison of the whole supply chain’s profits in
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Figure 2: The profits of the retailer as 𝑆 increases.
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Figure 3: The profits of the whole supply chain as 𝑆 increases.

prefers the decision on farsighted behavior, whereas the
retailer prefers a myopic cooperator. Can this dilemma be
solved? We should study the profits of the whole supply chain
between two behaviors. From Figure 3, it is illustrated that
when 𝑆 < 0.436, the profits of the supply chain in the
farsighted case are larger than those in the myopic case. Then,
the best choice of the manufacturer is the farsighted behavior,
which is consistent with the selection of the whole supply
chain. Thus, the dilemma can not be solved.
However, when 𝑆 > 0.436, the manufacturer’s behavior
choice is not consistent with the whole supply chain. In this
situation, changing the choice of the manufacturer’s behavior
can deal with this dilemma [26]. It can resort to the lump
sum transfer contract, which can handle this dilemma. Since
𝑉𝑠𝑐𝑀 > 𝑉𝑠𝑐𝐹 when 𝑆 < 0.436, where 𝑉𝑠𝑐𝑀 = 𝑉𝑚𝑀 + 𝑉𝑟𝑀 and

𝑉𝑠𝑐𝐹 = 𝑉𝑚𝐹 + 𝑉𝑟𝐹 , the manufacturer opts to be myopia if it can
gain a lump sum payment 𝐿 𝑚 (𝑉𝑚𝐹 − 𝑉𝑚𝑀 < 𝐿 𝑚 < 𝑉𝑟𝑀 − 𝑉𝑟𝐹 )
as compensation from the retailer. Hence, the manufacturer
changes to the myopic behavior, which is consistent with the
retailer’s preference.
Furthermore, in both the farsighted and the myopic scenarios, we find that the manufacturer’s profits are decreasing
in the emission permit price, while the retailer’s profits are
first decreasing and then increasing. This is because, on the
one hand, the cost of the emission reduction is directly taken
by the manufacturer and increases with the raising of the
emission permit price. On the other hand, the retailer’s profits
are mainly influenced by the market demand, which depends
on the retail price and the emissions. When the emission
permit price is at a lower level, the market demand is mainly
influenced by the retail price. In addition, the retailer raises
the retail price since the manufacturer raises the wholesale
price to make up for the emission cost. Thus, the demand
is decreasing and the retailer’s profits are correspondingly
decreasing. On the contrary, when the emission permit price
is at a higher level, the emissions play a major role in
demand. A higher level of emission reduction leads to a
higher demand. Therefore, the retailer gains more with the
increase of the emission permit price.
In Figures 4 and 5, we compare the whole supply chain’s
profits with respect to 𝑆 and 𝛾1 , and 𝑆 and 𝛾2 , respectively.
It is concluded that, for a certain emission permit price,
the myopic manufacturer harvests a higher proportion of
the whole supply chain’s profits when the market demand
is more sensitive to the emissions or when the reference
emission effect is weaker. The reason is that the manufacturer’s choice of myopic behavior results in a high level of
emission reduction. From another point of view, for a fixed
emission sensitivity or for a fixed marginal contribution of
the gap between the emissions and the reference emissions on
demand, the farsighted profits of the whole supply chain are
higher when the emission permit price is relatively low. This
is because a low emission permit price leads to a low level of

Complexity

11

1.19

2.1

1.09

1.9

0.99

1.7

VscF > VscM

0.89

1.5
2

R2 p2

0.79
0.69

1.1

0.59
VscF

0.49

<

VscM

0.9

0.39
0.29

1.3

0.7
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.5

0.9

S

Figure 5: The comparison of the whole supply chain’s profits in
terms of 𝛾2 and 𝑆.

0

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
2

1

farsighted
myopic

Figure 7: The emission-price product as 𝛾2 increases.
3

effects, the consumers’ welfare gap between the two behaviors
is enlarged. In other words, consumers can gain more when
they are more sensitive to the difference between the actual
emissions and the reference emissions.
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Figure 6: The emission-price product as 𝑆 increases.

emission reduction and hence leads to high reference emissions. Therefore, the farsighted manufacturer considers the
reference emissions and avoids the corresponding negative
effects on customer demand. Thus, a farsighted manufacturer
brings high profits to the whole supply chain.
In Figures 6 and 7, we investigate the effects of the
parameters 𝑆 and 𝛾2 on the interest of the consumers. As
mentioned in Proposition 10, the welfare of the consumers
can be measured by the emission-price product. The myopic
behavior results in a better welfare to the consumers. From
Figure 6, we find that the consumers’ welfare increases as the
emission permit price raises. Thus, for the government, setting a high emission permit price benefits not only the whole
supply chain, but also the consumers. Figure 7 illustrates that,
with the increase on the strength of the reference emission

Under dynamic situation, the supply chain members have
two behavioral strategies to choose: to be farsighted or to
be myopic. The former one considers the future influence of
the current decision on the evolution of the state dynamics,
while the latter one is only concentrated on the immediate
profits. In order to investigate how the behavior choice
affects the operations decisions and pay-offs of the supply
chain members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game
model, in which the manufacturer, as a leader, determines
the wholesale price and the emission reduction level and the
retailer, as a follower, makes a decision on the retail price.
The effects of actual manufacturing emissions and reference
emissions are also considered in this model. We give the
comparison and analysis of emission reduction and pricing
strategies as well as the profits in both the farsighted and the
myopic scenarios. As a result, some interesting findings with
managerial insights are obtained.
From the perspective of the supply chain members, we
observe the following results. First, the farsighted manufacturer prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction
than the myopic one does. Second, the wholesale/retail
price is higher (conversely, lower) in the farsighted scenario
than that in the myopic scenario when the emission permit
price is relatively higher (conversely, lower). However, the
threshold of the emission permit price for the manufacturer
is lower than that for the retailer. What is more, when the
emission permit price is relatively high, the manufacturer’s
choice of farsighted behavior results in lower profits of the
whole supply chain. Hence, this dilemma of the behavioral
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choice can be solved by the negotiation through a lump sum
transfer contract. Then, the supply chain members can reach
agreement and achieve Pareto improvement.
From the perspective of the consumers, we get a better
understanding of the impacts of the behavior choice. A
myopic manufacturer results in the high level of emission
reduction and the low retail price when the emission permit
price is relatively high (i.e., 𝑆 > 3𝛾1 /𝛽) and hence makes
the consumers better off. By using the concept of emissionprice product to measure the consumer welfare, we conclude
that the condition for the better consumer welfare is much
weaker than the former condition 𝑆 > 3𝛾1 /𝛽. In other words,
a myopic manufacturer leads to a better consumer welfare in
most cases. Moreover, it is beneficial for the consumers when
they are more sensitive to the difference between the actual
emissions and the reference emissions and/or the emission
permit price is higher.
From the perspective of the government, we find that the
emission quota affects only the manufacturer’s profits and
has no influence on retailer’s profits and both the supply
chain members’ strategies. Thus, the government should
allocate sufficient carbon quota to ensure profitability of the
manufacturer firstly and then can raise the emission permit
price in the carbon trade market indirectly by reducing the
whole quota allocated to the industry. Therefore, the relatively
high emission permit price leads the manufacturer to act as
myopic behavior and results in the high level of both the
emission reduction and the consumer welfare.
Although we obtain some important managerial insights
in this paper, there exist some limitations which can be
extended in future. First, the behavior choice of the retailer
has no effect on the emission reduction and pricing strategies.
Then, it can be considered that the retailer’s pricing strategies
influence the dynamics of the reference emissions, and hence
the retailer’s behavioral choice affects the decisions of both
the supply chain members. Second, we only consider the
dynamics of a single state, i.e., the reference emissions. Other
factors, such as the reference price, the reference quality, the
learning effect, and goodwill can be added into our models
and studied simultaneously. Additionally, it may be interesting to make the supply chain structure more complicated, e.g.,
considering the competitions of two/multiple manufacturers
or two/multiple retailers.

Appendix

𝑆𝐸 (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑤 + 𝛾2 𝑅 − 𝐸 (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) (1 − 𝜏))
+ (𝑤 − 𝑐 − 𝑆𝐸 (1 − 𝜏)) (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸 − 2𝑘𝜏
− 2𝜃𝐸

𝜕𝑅

(A.2)

= 0.

Then, we get the wholesale price and the emission reduction
level for the manufacturer as follows:
𝑤=

𝜏=

𝛾2 (2𝛽𝑘 + (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸𝑎1 − 𝑎12 )
𝛽𝑎2

⋅𝑅

+

2𝜃𝐸 (𝑎1 − 2 (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸) 𝜕𝑉𝑚𝐹 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐
⋅
+
𝑎2
𝜕𝑅
2𝛽

+

(𝑎1 − 2 (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸) (4𝛽𝑘 − (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐) 𝑎1 )
,
2𝛽𝑎2

𝛾2 𝑎1
4𝛽𝜃𝐸 𝜕𝑉𝑚𝐹 𝑎1 𝑎3
⋅𝑅−
⋅
.
+
𝑎2
𝑎2
𝜕𝑅
𝑎2

(A.3)

(A.4)

Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (8) produces

𝑝=

𝛾2 (3𝛽𝑘 + (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸𝑎1 − 𝑎12 )
𝛽𝑎2

⋅𝑅

+

𝜃𝐸 (𝑎1 − 4 (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸) 𝜕𝑉𝑚𝐹 3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐
⋅
+
𝑎2
𝜕𝑅
4𝛽

+

(𝑎1 − 4 (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) 𝐸) (4𝛽𝑘 − (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐) 𝑎1 )
.
4𝛽𝑎2

(A.5)

Then, inserting (A.3)-(A.5) into (10) yields
𝜌𝑉𝑚 =

𝑘𝛾22 2 𝜃𝑎4
2𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑉 2
⋅𝑅 −
⋅𝑅 𝑚 +
⋅ ( 𝑚)
2𝑎2
𝑎2
𝜕𝑅
𝑎2
𝜕𝑅
+

𝜃𝐸 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) 𝜕𝑉𝑚 𝑘𝑎32
𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3
⋅𝑅+
⋅
+
𝑎2
𝑎2
𝜕𝑅
2𝑎2

(A.6)

+ 𝑆𝐸0 .
Conjecture the following quadratic value function of the
manufacturer

A.

𝑉𝑚 = 𝑥2 𝑅2 + 𝑥1 𝑅 + 𝑥0 ,

A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The value functions 𝑉𝑟𝐹 and 𝑉𝑚𝐹 , which should be
bounded and continuous, need to be established. This ensures
that the solution 𝑅(𝑡) to (6a), (6b), and (6c) and the HJB
Equations (9) and (10) is existent and unique.
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to 𝑤 and 𝜏
for the right side of (10) yields
𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑤 + 𝛽𝑐 + 𝛾2 𝑅 + (𝛽𝑆 − 𝛾1 − 𝛾2 ) 𝐸 (1 − 𝜏) = 0,

𝜕𝑉𝑚𝐹

(A.1)

(A.7)

where 𝑥0 , 𝑥1 , and 𝑥2 are constants, which should be determined in the following. Substituting (A.7) and the partial
derivatives of the value function into (A.6) and equating
corresponding coefficients yield
𝜌𝑥2 =

𝑘𝛾22 2𝜃𝑎4
8𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2 2
−
𝑥2 +
𝑥2 ,
2𝑎2
𝑎2
𝑎2

(A.8)
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2𝜃𝐸 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 )
8𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2
𝜃𝑎4
𝑥1 +
𝑥1 𝑥2 +
𝑥2
𝑎2
𝑎2
𝑎2

𝑘𝛾 𝑎
+ 2 3,
𝑎2
𝜌𝑥0 =

(A.9)

𝑘𝑎2
2𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2 2 𝜃𝐸 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 )
𝑥1 +
𝑥1 + 3 + 𝑆𝐸0 . (A.10)
𝑎2
𝑎2
2𝑎2

A.2. Proof of Proposition 2

Thus, it follows from (A.8) that
𝑥2 =

Then, substituting the partial derivatives of the value function
into (A.3)-(A.5), we can get the wholesale price, emission
reduction level, and the retail price, i.e., (18)-(20). Substituting the above results into (9) and following the same computational procedure as the value function of the manufacturer,
we get the value function of the retailer which is shown in
(22).

𝜌𝑎2 + 2𝜃𝑎4 ± Δ
.
16𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2

(A.11)

Proof. Substituting the equilibrium emission reduction level,
i.e., (18), into the state equation, i.e., (1), we have the following
differential equation:

If we select the larger root of (A.11), the dynamics of
reference emission would not converge to a steady-state
value in the further calculation. Hence, in the following
discussions, we only consider the smaller root, i.e.,
𝑥2 =

𝜌𝑎2 + 2𝜃𝑎4 − Δ
.
16𝛽𝜃2 𝐸2

𝑎5 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3
,
4𝛽𝜃𝐸 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

𝑥0 =

𝑘a23
𝑆𝐸0
+
𝜌
2𝜌𝑎2
+

(A.13)

(𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) (𝑎5 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3 )
4𝜌𝛽𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

(A.14)

2

+

(𝑎5 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1 𝑎3 ) + 8𝛽𝜃𝐸𝑘𝛾2 𝑎3 )
2

8𝜌𝛽𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

(A.15)

A particular solution to (A.15) is given by

(A.12)

Substituting (A.12) into (9) and (10) yields
𝑥1 =

𝜌𝑎 − Δ
2𝜃𝐸𝑎6
𝑅̇ (𝑡) = 2
𝑅+
.
2𝑎2
𝑎2 (Δ + 𝜌𝑎2 )

𝑅∞ =

4𝜃𝐸𝑎6
.
Δ2 − 𝜌2 𝑎22

(A.16)

Then, according to the initial condition 𝑅(0) = 𝑅0 , we
obtain the corresponding solution shown in (26). Moreover,
substituting (26) into (18)-(20) yields the corresponding
control paths shown in (23)-(25). Substituting (23)-(25) into
(2), we have the demand path shown in (27).
A.3. Proof of Corollary 3. In virtue of (23)-(25) in
Proposition 2, the corresponding strategies can be obtained
immediately.
A.4. Proof of Corollary 4

.

Proof. From (29), we get

𝐹
𝜕𝑅∞
64𝛽𝜃3 𝐸2 𝑘𝛾2 𝑎22 (𝛾2 𝐸 + 𝑎3 )
< 0,
=−
2
𝜕𝜌
(Δ2 − 𝜌2 𝑎2 )

(A.17)

𝐹
𝜕𝑅∞
4𝛽𝑘𝐸2 𝜌 (𝜌 + 𝜃) (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛽𝑆𝐸 − 𝛾1 𝐸)
=−
< 0,
𝜕𝛾2
𝐴20

(A.18)

𝐹
𝜕𝑅∞
4𝛽𝑘𝐸2 𝜌𝛾2 (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛽𝑆𝐸 − 𝛾1 𝐸)
> 0,
=
𝜕𝜃
𝐴20

(A.19)

𝐹
𝜕𝑅∞
4𝛽𝐸2 (𝜌 + 𝜃) (𝜌 (𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 ) + 𝜃 (𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾1 )) (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛽𝑆𝐸 − 𝛾1 𝐸)
> 0,
=
𝜕𝑘
𝐴20

(A.20)

2

since the demand should be positive, i.e., 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 − 𝛽𝑆𝐸 − 𝛾1 𝐸 >
0, where

𝐹
=1−
𝜏∞

2

𝐴 0 = (𝜌 + 𝜃) (𝛾1 + 𝛽𝑆) 𝐸2 + 𝜌𝛾2 (𝛾1 + 𝛽𝑆) 𝐸2

𝐹
𝑅∞
,
𝐸

(A.22)

(A.21)

𝐹
=
𝑤∞

𝐹
𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 (𝛽𝑆 − 𝛾1 ) 𝑅∞
+
,
2𝛽
2𝛽

(A.23)

Then, we get the second column in Table 1. From (29)-(33), it
is clear that

𝐹
𝑝∞
=

𝐹
3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐 (𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 ) 𝑅∞
+
,
4𝛽
4𝛽

(A.24)

− 4𝛽𝑘 (𝜌 + 𝜃) .
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Complexity
𝐹
𝐷∞
=

𝐹
𝛼 − 𝛽𝑐 (𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾1 ) 𝑅∞
−
.
4
4

𝐹
,
Thus, taking the first-order partial derivative of 𝑤∞

(A.25)
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𝐹
𝑝∞
,

𝐹
𝐷∞

with respect to parameters 𝜌, 𝛾2 , 𝜃 and 𝑘, respectively, we can
easily get the rest of the columns in Table 1.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of Proposition 5 is
similar to those of Propositions 1 and 2.
A.6. Proof of Corollary 6
𝑀
Proof. On the basis of (40) and (41), we have 𝑉𝑚,𝑚
(𝑅) −
2
𝑀
𝑀
𝑉𝑟 (𝑅) = ((2𝛽𝑘 − ((𝛽𝑆 + 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )𝐸) )/2𝛽𝑘)𝑉𝑟 (𝑅). Thus, it is
𝑀
(𝑅) < 𝑉𝑟𝑀(𝑅) if 𝑆 > √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )/𝛽;
known that 𝑉𝑚,𝑚
𝑀
𝑀
𝑉𝑚,𝑚 (𝑅) = 𝑉𝑟 (𝑅) if 𝑆 = √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )/𝛽; and
𝑀
𝑉𝑚,𝑚
(𝑅) > 𝑉𝑟𝑀(𝑅) if 𝑆 < √2𝑘/𝐸√𝛽 − (𝛾1 + 𝛾2 )/𝛽.

A.7. Proof of Corollary 7. By virtue of (35)-(37) in
Proposition 5, we can easily get the corresponding strategies
in the myopic scenario.
A.8. Proof of Corollary 8. The proof of Corollary 8 is similar
to that of Corollary 4.
A.9. Proof of Proposition 9
𝐹
𝐹
Proof. Table 1 shows that 𝜏∞
is increasing in 𝜌; 𝑤∞
is
decreasing in 𝜌 if 𝑆 > 𝛾1 /𝛽 holds and increasing in 𝜌
𝐹
is decreasing in 𝜌 if 𝑆 > 3𝛾1 /𝛽 holds and
otherwise; 𝑝∞
increasing in 𝜌 otherwise. Moreover, when 𝜌 → +∞, all
the steady-state strategies in the farsighted scenario are in
accord with those in the myopic scenario. Thus, Proposition 9
is obtained immediately.

A.10. Proof of Proposition 10
𝐹
𝐹 𝐹
Proof. Let 𝐺(𝑅∞
) = 𝑅∞
𝑝∞ . From (A.24), we have
𝐹
𝐹
𝐹
𝐺(𝑅∞ ) = 𝑅∞ ((3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐)/4𝛽 + ((𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 )/4𝛽)𝑅∞
), and
𝐹
𝐹
𝐹
then 𝑑𝐺(𝑅∞ )/𝑑𝑅∞ = ((𝛽𝑆 − 3𝛾1 )/2𝛽)𝑅∞ + (3𝛼 + 𝛽𝑐)/4𝛽.
𝐹
𝑀
𝐹
Since 𝑅∞
→ 𝑅∞
when 𝜌 → +∞, and 𝜕𝑅∞
/𝜕𝜌 < 0
derived from the proof of Corollary 3, as a result, we get
Proposition 10.

Abbreviations
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development
HJB: Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman.
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